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Abstract 
This paper empirically examines whether yield spreads of subordinated debt 
issued by UK banks are sensitive to bank risks, with a dataset that includes spreads, 
ratings, accounting measures of bank risks and market condition indexes in the sample 
period between 1997 and 2009. The results show that Moody’s and S&P traditional 
ratings have significant and negative impacts on spreads, and investors have exercised 
sensible discrimination between different risk profiles of UK financial institutions. 
However, accounting measures show an absence of the explanatory power of the 
spreads. Market condition indicators, particularly those related to European markets, 
also have significant influence on credit yield spreads. The findings indicate that, in 
the UK, sub-debt spreads do reflect the issuing banks’ risk-taking, hence satisfying a 
critical precondition for sub-debts to be an instrument of market discipline in banking.  
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Subordinated Debt as Instrument of Market 
Discipline: Risk Sensitivity of Sub-Debt Yield Spreads 
in UK Banking 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial crisis has exposed underlying deficiencies of the current banking 
supervision. The growing size and complexity of banks makes it increasing difficult 
for regulators to monitor and control banks’ excessive risk-taking through traditional 
means. Policy designs such as the deposit insurance scheme and the too-big-to-fail 
problem as highlighted by government bailouts in recent years further compound the 
situation. This leads to rekindled interests in considering involving market discipline 
in reform of bank regulation (Evanoff, Jagtiani and Nakata, 2011).  
An essential element in the proposals for promoting market discipline in the 
banking industry is the mandatory issuance of subordinated debts (sub-debts) by large 
banks at regular intervals. Success of the sub-debt proposals however is crucially 
dependant on whether yields on sub-debts are correlated with banks’ risk-taking 
(Evanoff and Wall 2001; Goyal 2005). Defined as the difference between the yields on 
sub-debt and the yields on a Treasury security issued in the same currency with 
similar maturity (Balasubramnian and Cyree, 2011), the sub-debt spread could embed 
information about financial conditions of the bank if it is found to reflect a bank’s 
risks. Then based on the spreads, market participants could evaluate investment in the 
banks concerned. Banking supervisors could also benefit from monitoring the spreads 
since the market information conveyed by the spreads have proved to be as good as or 
even better than the information extracted from the traditional off-site monitoring 
practice at predicting the riskiness of banks (Evanoff and Wall, 2001, 2002). It can 
*Manuscript, excluding Author Details
Click here to view linked References
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therefore also facilitate early detection of stressed banks (Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2001), 
and hence better allocation of regulatory resources.   
While several studies show that sub-debt spreads reflect bank risks (Hancock and 
Kwast, 2001, Morgan and Stiroh, 2001, and Sironi, 2003), there are reports indicating 
that evidence of the existence of a risk-spread relationship is either weak or 
insignificant, casting doubts on the usefulness of sub-debts being deployed as a 
channel for market discipline. Evanoff et al. (2011) suggest that the quality of market 
signal is an evolving process; it may improve when the same country shifts to a new 
environment where the sub-debt market becomes deeper. This research contributes to 
the debate with evidence from a different country than the U.S.A but also has a 
well-developed banking market and comparable sub-debt market.  
We in this study examine the risk sensitivity of UK banks’ sub-debt spreads. 
Previous research mainly concerns the US banks, and to a lesser extent European and 
Japanese banks. Our study complements the plethora of prior empirical studies by 
analysing the UK market. British banks have their particular attractions as a case for 
studying desirability and feasibility of subordinated debt as an instrument of market 
discipline.  
In the global subordinated debt market, the British banks have been very active. 
According to the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (2003), in terms of 
amounts issued, the British sub-debt market is no smaller than the US market. In 
terms of sub-debt issued through public placement, the UK market is even greater 
than all other European markets putting together. However, the existing literature is 
largely silent about this very important UK market. Moreover, most of the debt 
securities issued by the UK banks are publicly placed, hence the scope for and depth 
of the working of market discipline via sub-debts could be substantial in the UK 
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banking industry, as compared to privately issued debt, as is the situations in Germany 
and Japan. 
To investigate the risk-spread relationship in the UK, a dataset is constructed 
over the period of 1997 – 2009, which contains spreads, ratings, accounting measures 
of bank risks and market condition indicators. Our empirical evidence confirms that 
the UK banks’ sub-debt spreads are related to risk measures assigned by traditional 
rating agencies. Particularly for Moody and S&P ratings, when ratings worsen, 
spreads rise. Furthermore, sub-debt investors seem to have rational discriminations 
between different risk profiles of UK credit institutions. Some accounting measures of 
bank risks show an absence of explanatory power of spreads, hence there is a lack of 
evidence that the spreads reflect the risk indicators in terms of accounting measures. 
Market conditions, especially European market indicators, have a significant impact 
on the yields. 
These findings confirm that, in the UK, sub-debt spreads are sensitive to the 
issuing bank’s risk-taking behaviour and its strategic decisions. Given this, market 
participants have incentives to extract information from the spread and allay 
information asymmetry. As a result, they can require appropriate premiums according 
to banks risk levels, implying that the risk-sensitive spreads can promote the market 
(sub-debt holders) to exert discipline on banks through the cost effect. By revealing 
evidence on influences of different components of the risk-spread nexus, this research 
also provides a wider-ranging understanding of the role of the spread in the market 
discipline mechanism, hence advances the existing knowledge on the relevant factors 
that affect the risk-spread relationship and feasibility of sub-debt as an avenue for 
market discipline (e.g. Sironi, 2003; and Caldwell, 2007). 
The structure of this paper is organized as follows: section two presents a review 
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of prior studies. The econometrical formations of the model to be estimated and 
methodology used in this research are outlined in section three. In section four the 
data sources are explained and sample characteristics are described. Interpretations of 
the empirical results are shown in section five, while section six concludes the paper. 
 
2. Related Literature  
Earlier studies find a general lack of sensitivity of the spreads to bank risks Avery, 
Belton, and Goldberg (1988) find no significant effect of balance sheet risk measures 
on the spreads, and conclude that market investors do not discipline and control bank 
risk-taking in the usual manner. Gorton and Santomero (1990) regress the implied 
asset volatilities on the risk indicators, only to find virtually no relation between a 
bank's risk measures and its implied asset volatility. This led them to believing that 
there is little support for the presence of market discipline in the subordinated debt 
market. But these finds are based on data from the early 1980s. 
Significant evidence however emerges in later empirical investigations, 
particularly after 1991 when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act was enacted. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) and DeYoung, Flannery, Lang and 
Sorescu (2001) show that, the spreads are correlated with the riskiness of American 
banks. Jagtiani and Lemieux (2000) confirm that bond markets differentiate banks 
with different levels of risk exposure. Morgan and Stiroh (2000) investigate the 
disciplinary role of markets using the spreads, ratings, and bank portfolio data on 
bond issues including nearly 600 of those issued by banking organizations between 
1993 and 1998. They find that the market prices bank risk efficiently and banks 
contemplating a shift into riskier activities would expect to pay higher spreads as a 
result. According to them, that is market discipline. Fan, Haubrich, Ritchken,  
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Thomson (2003) find that credit spreads on both sub-debts provide relatively clean 
signals of bank risk that are not unduly influenced by non-risk factors. Other research 
that has found a significant risk-spread relationship can be found in Allen, Jagtiani, 
and Moser (2001), DeYoung, et al. (2001), Jagtiani and Lemiexu (2001), Jagtiani, 
Kaufman, and Lemineux (2002), Flannery and Nikolova (2003), Sironi (2003), 
Hamalainen, Howcroft and Hall (2007, 2010), Hamalainen, Pop, Hall and Howcroft 
(2012), Evanoff, et al. (2011). Research by Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002) 
additionally show that sub-debt spreads can even be better at identifying problem 
banks than traditional off-site monitoring measures used by U.S. bank supervisors.  
Despite the growing evidence of a positive risk-spread relationship in sub-debt, 
concerns persist about the existence of some influences that may impede the efficacy 
of the spreads as a signalling device of market discipline (Blum, 1999, 2002).  
Flannery and Sorescu (1996), for example, point out that the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) 
perception may mislead sub-debt creditors into believing that they would not suffer 
credit losses on debt issues of the largest banks. Hence, this can (and will) distort the 
risk-spread relationship. While the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
imposed losses on sub-debt holders at failed large banks in the late 1980s and passed 
the least-cost resolution provisions in 1991 as part of Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), the TBTF mentality is hardly dispelled 
among debt-holders, hence the continuation of the distortion. Recognizing the 
usefulness of the sub-debt yield in supervisory monitoring, Hancock and Kwast (2001) 
underscore the need of careful judgment when interpreting the spreads, since the 
risk-spread relationship could be affected by factors such as relative issuance size, age 
of the issuer, and size of the issuing banks. Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2005) 
maintain that both yield spread levels and changes should reflect risk along the entire 
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yield spread curve. They find that, over 1994 – 1999, changes in yield spreads do not 
reflect changes in default risk, although yield spread levels do reflect firm-specific 
risks. Similar scepticism about the information contents and quality of the spreads can 
be found in Board of Governors (2000), Bliss and Flannery (2001), Birchler and 
Hancock (2004), among others.  
Balasubramniam and Cyree (2011) argue that three factors are omitted in 
previous research: (1) The reduction in the default risk after introduction of 
trust-preferred securities in 1996; (2) Enhanced TBTF perception of debt-holders after 
bailout of the Long Term Capital Management in 1998, which reduces the risk 
sensitivity of the spreads. (3) The increase in idiosyncratic volatility. The paradigm 
changes following the LTCM bailout cause some traditional determinants of yield 
spreads to become irrelevant. On the other hand, the firm-level volatility becomes a 
critical determinant of banks’ default risk. Plugging these factors into the same 
regression model used by previous research (together with the tax effect) and 
examining the full sample from 1994 – 1999, they find that the level of sub-debt 
spread reflect firm-specific default risks. In response to criticism about the quality of 
sub-debt signal, Evanoff et al. (2011) argue that previous studies evaluated the spreads 
when the sub-debt market was underdeveloped. With a fully implemented sub-debt 
program, the signalling quality may change. They present evidence to show a superior 
risk-spread relationship when the sub-debt market has greater liquidity and 
transparency, such as the one surrounding the period of new debt issuance. 
International evidence about the risk-spread relationship in the sub-debt market is 
diverse as well. In Canada, Caldwell (2007) develops a dynamic model of banking 
competition to compare which capital instrument is most effective in disciplining 
Canadian bank’s risk choice. Recognizing that sub-debt spreads can reflect the issuing 
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bank’s riskiness, the research finds that equity weakly dominates sub-debts and 
uninsured deposit, with sub-debt weakly dominating uninsured deposit in discipline 
banks. Imai (2007) shows that the sub-debt spreads can differentiate banks in terms of 
the level of risk they take. Investors are found to punish risky banks by requiring 
higher return rates. Such sensitivity of yield spreads in Japanese banks increases 
dramatically after the removal by the Japanese government of implicit guarantees. 
However, evidence of the relationship between spreads and accounting indicators of 
bank risk is weak. 
Bruni and Paterno (1995) were among the first to empirically investigate into the 
risk-spread relationship in European banks. They find some evidence of sensitivity of 
sub-debt yields to Moody’s ratings, suggesting the spreads can reflect European 
banks’ riskiness. But their research is restricted to only one day price information of 
28 bonds.  
Sironi (2001, 2003) provides a comprehensive analysis of whether private 
investors discriminate between the risks taken by large European banks. The work 
centres on testing the risk sensitivity of European banks' at-issue sub-debt spreads. He 
finds evidence that investors in the primary sub-debt market are sensitive to bank risk 
and the sensitivity to measures that excludes implied governmental guarantees is on 
the rise for the second half of the 1990s. However, sub-debts issued by public banks, 
i.e., government owned or guaranteed show no such sensitivity.  
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006) tackle the informativeness of the spreads from a 
different angle. Using a sample of EU banks, they test for the predictive performance 
of the spreads, along with the distance to default, and find that the spreads are reliable 
early-warning signals but only shortly before the material downgrading of the 
traditional ratings. Additionally, they find that the predictive power of spreads will be 
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weakened by implicit safety nets.  
Birchler and Facchinetti (2007) finds mixed evidence on information content of 
the sub-debt spreads in Switzerland banks. For non-state-owned banks, sub-debt 
spreads are informative as the spreads react to changes in the risk profile of the issuer. 
But for cantonal banks, this sensitivity disappears mainly because liabilities of these 
public banks are guaranteed by the state hence distorting investors’ perception of the 
riskiness of the issuing banks. Furthermore, there is little evidence that information 
from the spreads is useful to Swiss banking supervisor as early warning indicators. 
The sub-debt market does not seem to have more timely information about individual 
institutions than the banking supervisor. 
Pop (2009) recently complements Sironi’s (2003) research by focusing instead on 
the secondary market yield spreads. On the whole, the research findings suggest that 
credit spreads are sensitive to the financial conditions and risk profiles of bank issuers, 
as reflected in traditional credit ratings and especially Moody’s Bank Financial 
Strength and Fitch-IBCA Individual ratings. But the relation between the spreads and 
various accounting measures of bank risk and performance is weaker. 
Research into the UK case is quite thin (Baumann and Nier, 2003; Hamalainer, et 
al. 2003; Hamalainen, et al. 2007, 2010; Hamalainen, et al. 2012). Hamalainen et al. 
(2003) focus on examining the mandatory subordinated debt policy in the UK and 
assessing the suitability of introducing into UK banking regulation the mandatory 
subordinated notes and a debentures policy. Furthermore, the authors explore the 
issuance of sub-debts and their characteristics at the firm level of a bank and, 
uniquely, considered them in relation to regulatory, structural and economic events 
that are either specific to the UK or otherwise affect international banking. The 
findings are that sub-debt spreads are able to reflect banks’ financial health as 
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measured through balance-sheet or other market indicators. The UK evidence is 
important since, in value terms and for public placement, the UK sub-debt market is 
the second largest after the US. However, compared to the numerous studies on the 
US sub-debt market, the UK case is much under-researched.   
In the previous literature, using rating indicators assigned by different rating 
agencies appears to be intuitive. Sironi (2003) employs the Moody’s Banking 
Financial Strength (MBFS) and Fitch IBCA individual (FII) ratings to analyze data 
concerning issuers, investors, markets and securities structure. The research has a 
unique comprehensive browse through the market of banks’ subordinated notes and 
debentures in Europe. 
The use of accounting variables in previous research is quite common. Flannery 
and Sorescu (1996) hypothesize that a bank’s spread should increase relative to the 
level of risk implied by its accounting reports as measured by loan quality, leverage, 
interest rate risk exposure, and profitability. In addition, debt-holders could monitor 
banks’ risk through these accounting indicators. Benink and Benston (2005) claim that 
the present regulatory structure of European banks is unlikely to achieve banking 
stability in the future based on the record of and changes in EU banking regulation, 
new data on bank capital/asset ratios in ten European countries and an analysis of 
market and technological changes.   
Very few studies have considered market condition variables. But Park and 
Perostiani (1998) do use several market variation control variables, intending to test 
the presence of depositor discipline, including local banking wage and state 
population growth.  
 
3. Empirical Models and Methodology for the Risk-Spread 
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Relationship   
As in the previous literature, this study also correlates the yields to maturity 
spread of subordinated debt to observable risk measures in the UK banking industry. 
Previous proposals have recommended using subordinated debt yield spreads as a 
trigger for supervisory discipline. Evanoff and Wall (2001) provide the first empirical 
analysis of the relative accuracy of various capital ratios and subordinated debt 
spreads in predicting a bank's condition, suggesting that the performance of sub-debt 
yield spreads satisfy an important pre-requisite for using sub-debt as a trigger for 
regulatory action, which is known in the USA as Prompt Correct Action (PCA). The 
main reason for this is that some capital ratios, including the summary measure 
currently used to trigger PCA, have almost no predictive power. However sub-debt 
yield spreads of US banks perform slightly better than the best capital measure, the 
Tier – 1 leverage ratio. 
For the UK banking industry, we estimate the following baseline regression 
equation: 
SPREAD = f (RISK, MATU, AMOUNT, CURR, Market conditions) + εi    (1) 
    The spread is calculated as the difference between the yields to maturity of 
sub-debt at launch of issuance and the yield to maturity of corresponding currency 
Treasury security with a similar maturity. Maturity, amount and currency are sub-debt 
features. The maturity measured as the time to maturity (in years) of issue, the amount 
in the log of the US dollar equivalent amount of issue, and the currency adopted is the 
currency of denomination of issuance. The risk variable is captured by two alternative 
measures of the default risk of the issuing banks: the rating risk and bank risk, where: 
Rating Risk = (S&P ratings, Moody’s ratings, Fitch ratings, Moody’s Long Term 
ratings)                                                       (2) 
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Bank Risk = f (Leverage, Profitability, Asset Quality, Liquidity)          (3) 
In addition, the following bank-specific accounting variables are employed: 
LEV: the ratio of total (book) liabilities to the book value of equity. Higher leverage 
indicates higher default risk. 
ROA: the ratio of annual net income to the average of the proceeding and current 
year-end total assets. 
NLTA: the ratio of net loans to total assets. 
EITA: the ratio of equity investments to total assets. 
LIQ: the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ deposits and short term funding. 
LLRGL: the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans.  
FEST 100, FETS Euro, Nikkei, NASDAQ, Libor3M and Euro Libor 3M are used as 
market condition variables, to examine whether the blooming of sub-debt is because 
issuers realize that subordinated debt is a promising instrument of market discipline, 
or simply because the issuing banks and investors want greater portfolio investments. 
Control variables used in the four alternative specifications include: 
MATU: the time to maturity of issue. 
AMOUNT: the natural log of the US dollar-equivalent amount of the issue. 
STG, EURO, USD, OTHERCUR: currency dummies, i.e. pound sterling, the euro, US 
dollar and other currencies. 
Size: a control variable for the size of the issuing bank. It is calculated as a natural log 
of issuing bank’s total assets. 
Ratings given by the Standard & Poor, Moody’s and Fitch for each single issue 
are used as a measure of the default risk. These are the ratings assigned by one or all 
three rating agencies to a single issue at the time of issuance. Meanwhile, they can 
also reflect both the issuing bank's default risk and the facility's seniority and security 
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structure. In addition to the single issue ratings, Moody’s Long Term issuer ratings, 
which focus on the role of the issuing banks’ default risk, address the possibility that a 
financial obligation will not be honoured as promised. Such ratings reflect both the 
likelihood of default and the probability of a financial loss suffered in the event of 
default. Since Moody’s Long Term ratings were introduced more recently, they are 
only available for a smaller subset of issues. Dummy variables allow more flexibility 
than would result from imposing a linear specification, therefore, ratings are 
represented by dummy variables in both two ratings-based specifications, with each 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the issue or issuer has the corresponding grade and 0 
otherwise.   
In contrast to most of the studies on market discipline conducted using US banks’ 
subordinated notes and debentures data, this study is based on UK’s primary market 
spreads. The liquidity of the secondary market for European banks is generally quite 
poor, therefore, the use of secondary market spreads is avoided. Furthermore, yields 
on newly-issued bonds can reflect actual transaction prices, rather than “indicative 
prices”, which are estimated by brokers and derived from pricing matrices or dealers’ 
quotes. At the present time, from a bank’s point of view, yields of subordinated debt 
can provide a more accurate measure of actual cost, and also satisfy investors because 
of the provision of a more sophisticated measure of the risk premium measure. 
Another significant reason for using primary market spreads in this study is that the 
rating reflects the rates’ assessment near the time of the initial issuance (Federal 
Reserve System Study Group on Subordinated Notes and Debentures, 1999). 
All these specifications are estimated by fixed and random effects to reveal 
whether variation in independent variables within a bank affects the spreads 
differently than it does between issuers. The White method is used in covariance 
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matrices for the intention of correcting the heteroscedasticity problem in estimation. 
The Hausman test is used to compare the random and fixed effects of the estimated 
coefficients. The result is used to help decide which of the two models is more 
appropriate for adoption in the empirical investigation.   
 
4. Data Sources and Sample Characteristics 
The data is mainly taken from Moody’s Credit Report, Thompson One Banker 
and Datastream. Spreads of issued subordinated debt are fixed-rate, subordinated 
notes and debentures issued by UK banks. The sample period is between 1997 and 
2009, covering 631 issues of subordinated notes and debentures. 
For this sample from 1997 to 2009, two pronounced surges of sub-debt issuance 
need to be noted. First, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially around the period 
from 1999 to 2001, a relatively large number of subordinated debt issues was 
completed, compared with previous years. There are several possible reasons. Partly, 
the European banks’ sub-debt issues showed a general increase in the average 
number, indicating that European banks tended to issue subordinated debt when the 
market was more receptive (Sironi, 2003). The Russian financial crisis in 1998 is 
another reason for the larger number of issues during this period, since the banks 
were in a great need to replenish their capital 
Sub-debt issuance saw another upsurge around 2005 and 2006. This was largely 
the consequence of the launch of the New Basel Capital Accords (Basel II), which are 
recommendations for banking laws and regulations drafted by the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision. The initial purpose of Basel II, published in June 2004, was 
to create an international standard for banking regulators when writing regulations 
about how much capital banks need to put aside in order to guard against the types of 
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financial and operational risks they face. However, this new recommendation 
consequently spurred banks to issue sub-debts to top up their capital 
That the sample period happened upon these episodes of sub-debt upsurges 
should not limit adequacy of our sample as a basis for answering the key questions of 
this study. The upsurge in the first episode largely reflects the usual responses of 
banks to changing economic and market conditions. The second spike of sub-debt 
issuance results from the Basel II Accords’ establishment of the market discipline as 
the third pillar of banking regulation. Neither case would erode the validity of 
research into the signalling effect of sub-debts as a practical instrument of market 
discipline.   
Moody’s rating at issuance for these 631 issues are either from Moody’s rating 
watch list, or from Thompson One Banker. The former list is a relatively complete 
history of Moody’s long term rating assignments for both individual bonds and 
issuers, and for U.S and non-US corporations and sovereign bonds, including issuer 
names, locations, ISIN (International Securities Identification Number), bond 
issuance dates, maturity dates, ratings and coupons. The latter list provides detailed 
reports about subordinated bond issues in the primary market, including the basic 
information mentioned above, along with ratings from S&P and Fitch II, yields of 
new issuance, basis point spreads between benchmark securities, underwriters, etc. 
The market-index data are from DataStream, which provides a complete list of all 
index variables which have been employed for the sample period. Ratings 
classification is shown in Table 1, and detailed information on sample characteristics 
is provided in Tables 2 to 4. 
 
<Table 1 about here> 
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<Table 2 about here> 
 
<Table 3 about here> 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
 
Table 5 presents pair-wise correlations between employed variables. In panel A, 
which displays the correlations between subordinated debt characteristics, spreads 
have low correlations with issuing amount (0.0933) and maturity (0.0485). Panel B 
reports the relationss between ratings from three major rating agencies, and results 
indicate that each agency issues relatively independent ratings towards issued 
sub-debts and issuers. Correlations between accounting variables are low, with the 
exceptions of correlation between NLTA (the ratio of net loans to total assets) and 
EITA (the ratio of equity to total assets) with a value of 0.5646, and correlation 
between LIQ (the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ deposits and short term funding) 
and ROA (the ratio of returns on assets), with a value of 0.5357. Market condition 
variables have relatively higher correlations between variables. This result is not 
coincidental since stock markets are highly liquid and shocks to the stock markets 
tend to be contagious.   
<Table 5 about here> 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Impacts of Traditional Ratings on Sub-debt Spreads 
 
This section examines whether the ratings on sub-debt at launch assigned by 
traditional rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch in our study) impact on sub-debt 
spreads. Column 1 of Table 6 displays estimates all rating dummies (except Rating =5 
which is omitted) for S&P in regression, Column 2 reports estimations with Moody’s 
rating dummies, estimated coefficients on Fitch rating dummies are displayed in 
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Column 3.  
All rating dummies are statistically significant at the 1% level, except the Fitch 
ratings and Rating =4 in both S&P ratings and Moody’s. The monotonic pattern of 
dummy coefficients on S&P and Moody’s ratings indicates that spreads rise when 
ratings worsen. High ratings in Fitch (Rating =1, 2 and 3) fail to show significant 
relations with spreads, while Rating =4 shows a positive and 1% statistically 
significant coefficient. 
Amount has a negative coefficient in all alternative specifications. This result is 
different from previous results. Sironi (2003) examines the issuing amount’s impact 
on sub-debt spreads issued by European banks, and finds that the amount has a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient. A possible reason for this outcome is 
the rise of European banks sub-debt capital in two principle ways: private retail clients 
via distribution networks with private placements, which has a smaller average size 
and less bargaining power, and the targeting of institutional investors via public issues. 
Therefore, European investors may be less sensitive about sub-debt issuing spreads. 
On the contrary, our results imply that the sub-debt market in the UK has higher 
liquidity and wider issuance than the European market, excluding the UK. 
Furthermore, small issuance is usually made by smaller banks which raise capital less 
frequently than large banks; therefore investors might associate a higher portfolio 
diversification value with a smaller size sub-debt issuance and price them accordingly.  
STG (British pound) and USD (US dollar) are the only currency dummy 
variables which show positive and 1% level statistically significant coefficients. The 
results indicate that sub-debts issued in sterling and US dollars have higher spreads 
than other sub-debts denominated by other currencies. Potentially, it may be because 
Treasury securities in British pounds and US dollars pay lower yields and result in 
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higher sub-debt spreads, calculated by subtracting Treasury yields from sub-debt 
yields which tend to be higher. 
<Table 6 about here> 
 
For each regression，White’s tests for heteroscedasticity are conducted. Fixed and 
random effect models are also used to calculate coefficients in order to reveal whether 
variation in the independent variables within a bank affects the spreads differently 
than it does between issuers. The results under both fixed and random effects are 
shown in Table 7. Moreover, Hausman test statistics, carried out to ascertain the 
appropriateness of random effects, are reported at the bottom of Table 7. 
 
Estimated coefficients, calculated by Fixed and Random effects models are 
displayed in Table 7 along with Chi
2
 of Hausman tests for choosing between fixed and 
random effects. Test statistics fail to show significant signs of rejection of Hausman 
test’s null hypothesis, indicating that the random effects estimator is consistent. Upper 
classes of ratings (rating =1, 2 and 3) from S&P and Moody’s are negatively related to 
the spreads with statistically significant signs. Fitch rating dummies show an 
insignificant relation to spreads. However, the R
2
 statistics are relatively small, 
indicating that ratings and sub-debt characteristics variables explain a slim portion of 
subordinated debt spreads’ cross-sectional variability. These results differ from the 
results estimated under standard OLS. 
<Table 7 about here> 
5.2 Sensitivity of Sub-Debt Investors to UK Banks’ Risk Exposure 
From the empirical evidence of the UK banking industry, we can conclude that 
the relation between spreads and ratings of Moody’s, S&P and Fitch do provide 
reasonably strong evidence that sub-debt investors are sensitive to default risk. Next, 
18 
 
we look at in detail sub-debt investors’ sensitivity to the issuing banks’ general 
exposure to risks.  
The fourth specification of Equation (2) uses Moody’s Long Term issuer rating 
to test to what extent sub-debt investors react to banks’ general risk exposure. Column 
4 of Table 6 shows estimates when issuer ratings are used to predict movements of 
spreads. Results of issuer ratings are quite similar to issuance ratings. One possible 
explanation is that issuer and issuance ratings are highly correlated (correlations 
among ratings are reported in Panel B of Table 5).  
Column 4 of Table 7 shows results calculated by fixed effects estimation and 
Column 8 estimates parameters under random effects. The Hausman test rejects the 
hypothesis that a random effects estimator is consistent. The first two rating dummies 
have negative and insignificant coefficients. Other ratings (R3 and R4) show positive 
signs with spreads, without statistical significance at any reported level.  
These results indicate that for the sub-debts that have been assigned high ratings, 
when ratings on issues worsen, spreads rise. Contrary to traditional issuance rating, 
MATU has a positive and 5% level statistically significant coefficient, implying that 
issuer ratings have more influence on investors when they are concerned with 
sub-debt maturity. Unsurprisingly the STG and USD, two currency dummies, have 
positive and statistically significant coefficients.  
The R
2
 under all estimations for MLTR ratings are not significantly smaller than 
other specifications, unlike the results in previous studies (e.g. Sironi, 2003). These 
results not only indicate that subordinated debt investors are sensitive to the issuing 
banks’ risk exposures and price the risk accordingly, but also strongly support the 
hypothesis that subordinated debt investors can discriminate between the risks taken 
by banks. 
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5.3 Variability of Sub-debt Spreads and Accounting Measures of 
Bank Risks  
Other empirical studies in the field do not use the link between sub-debt and 
accounting-variables as an indicator of market discipline; they tend to only show that 
regulators and/or investors pay attention to accounting measures of risk. When 
comparing banks in different periods, two findings arise.  
First, many of the balance-sheet variables used as proxy for bank risk are not 
available for all the sub-debt issuing banks in the sample (such as LLRGL). Because 
of this problem, bivariate linear regressions have been conducted between sub-debt 
spreads and individual accounting variables. The results are shown in Table 8. 
Second, not all banks’ accounting data are available for all observation years in 
the sample period. A number of banks, building societies and bank holding companies 
were simply not in existence for some years of the sample. Due to this problem, our 
samples are selected from 1997 onwards, for which large portions of banks’ annual 
reports are available. Another reason is that certain banks co-funded a program to 
raise sub-debt capital. In such occasion, only the leading bank, or the one which 
invested the most in order to have an absolute control right (over 50%) is chosen as 
the observed bank. 
From our investigation, three important results emerge.  
First, accounting proxies of banks’ risk have little explanatory power regarding 
movements of UK banks’ sub-debt spreads. None of the estimated coefficients 
obtained from bivariate linear regressions on accounting measures, as reported in 
Panel A of Table 8, is significant. Moreover, small values of Adjusted R
2
 indicate that 
accounting measures explain only a small portion of variation of sub-debt spreads. 
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<Table 8 about here> 
 
Second, consistent with the results obtained from the stand-alone bilateral models  
based on accounting measures (Table 8), size, a natural log of issuing banks’ total 
assets, fails to display as statistically significant at any reported level. One potential 
explanation for this result is that, besides the economic advantages such as a higher 
portfolio diversification, more importantly, large banks have regulatory advantages, 
namely “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) guarantees (Sironi, 2003; Balasubramnian and Cyree, 
2011). Therefore, size fails to be a significant factor in explaining market participants’ 
expectation of variation of the spreads.   
Finally, accounting variable are still relatively poor in explaining the variation of 
sub-debt spreads. Column 2 of Table 9 reports estimated coefficients under fixed 
effects and Column 3 of the table outlines results estimated by random effects models. 
Due to negative values of Wald Chi
2
 of the Hausman test, we conduct Swamy-Aroara 
Hausman to distinguish the appropriateness between fixed and random effects models. 
The test statistics (reported at the bottom of Table 9) indicate that results under 
random effects are more reliable. The R
2
 statistics of random effects are greater than 
the Adj-R
2
 of OLS. 
However, individual accounting variables generally present unexpected 
coefficient signs. This may caused by the heterogeneous nature of the empirical 
sample of sub-debt issues as showed in Sironi (2003), who examines the sub-debt 
issued by European banks. The sample used in the present research includes 631 
issues completed by 135 UK banks and banking holding companies with an average 
number of issues per bank of 4.67. However, of the total 135 financial institutions, 58 
only issued once, while 42 banks issued less than four times during the 12 year period. 
The heterogeneous nature of the sub-debt issues of our sample is thus inevitable. 
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<Table 9 about here> 
 
5.4 Market Conditions and Sub-debt  
In this section a range of financial variables is employed to capture the influence 
of general economic and financial market conditions since sub-debt spreads may be 
affected by changes in the general business conditions.  The FTSE100 index captures 
the performance of the UK stock market, while the FTSEuro index indicates the 
European stock markets’ fluctuations. Also, the NASDAQ share index is used to 
represent the US market since the US dollar is the key sub-debt issuing currency, and 
use of the NIKKEI index is to indicate business conditions of the Japanese market. On 
top of these stock market indexes, LIBOR-3M and EuroLibor-3M are also used to 
capture the effects of interest rates.   
Table 10 shows results of bivariate regressions of spreads on a matrix of market 
indexes. All market condition variables have positive impacts on the spreads. 
FTSE100 is statistically significant at 5% and FTSEuro significant is at the 1% level, 
while the coefficient on NIKKEI is significant at 10% and NASDAQ does not show 
any significant signs. For the interest rate indicators, the London inter-bank lending 
rate LIBOR has no significant relation to spreads. However, the coefficient on the 
Eurocurrency market rate EUROLIBOR appears positive with a 5% level of statistical 
significance. These results indicate that spreads are affected by the developments of 
global stock markets and when the stock market levels out, sub-debt issuing spreads 
rise. Moreover, spreads are also impacted by credit market conditions. Interestingly, 
sub-debts issued by UK banks are more sensitive to Eurocurrency market movements 
.  
22 
 
<Table 10 about here> 
 
Table 11 shows the estimated coefficients calculated by OLS, and models of 
fixed effects and random effects. Different with results of rating dummies in previous 
regression analysis, amount fails to show significant signs. But STG and USD, the 
two main issuing currencies, appear positive with 1% level statistically significant 
signs, which is similar to the case where the regression analysis involves the rating 
dummies （Tables 6 and 7）. The results under fixed and random effects are similar to 
that estimated by OLS. The Hausman χ2 which is reported at the bottom of table 11 
suggests that the use of the fixed effects model is more reliable. FTSEURO index has 
a positive coefficient and significant at 10%, while other market condition variables 
show no sign of significant influence on sub-debt spreads. 
The possible reason for this outcome may chiefly be that the sub-debt market is 
less liquid than stock markets. With this, the result can be interpreted as market 
investors considering sub-debt as a highly-diversified investment instrument. Since 
most sub-debts are long term, investors are sensitive to issuers’ risk portfolios and 
take yield spreads as an effective instrument for monitoring issuing banks. 
 
<Table 11 about here> 
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6. Conclusions  
Success of the sub-debts as an instrument of market discipline is crucially 
dependant on whether the spreads between yields on sub-debts and on the 
corresponding Treasury bills are correlated with banks’ risk-taking. If they are  found 
to be related, the sub-debt spreads contain useful information about financial 
conditions of the bank and market participants can adjust their investment in the bank 
accordingly.  
Using a sample that covers 631 issues of sub-debts by UK banks during 1997 to 
2009, we investigate the risk-spread relationships in the UK banking industry.   We 
find that the UK banks’ sub-debt spreads co-vary with risk measures assigned by 
traditional rating agencies. Particularly for Moody and S&P ratings, when ratings 
worsen, spreads rise, and vice versa. Furthermore, sub-debt investors seem to have 
rational discriminations between different risk profiles of UK credit institutions. 
However, some accounting measures of bank risks show an absence of explanatory 
power of the spreads, hence there is a lack of evidence that the spreads reflect the risk 
indicators in terms of accounting measures. Market conditions, especially European 
market indicators, have a significant impact on the yield spreads. 
These findings show that, in the UK, sub-debt spreads are sensitive to the issuing 
bank’s strategic decisions and risk-taking behaviour. The UK evidence confirms that, 
market participants can have incentives to extract information from the spreads, allay 
information asymmetry and require premiums according to banks risk levels. This 
implies that the risk-sensitive spreads can promote the market to discipline banks 
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through the cost effect. By revealing evidence on influences of different components 
of the risk-spread nexus, this UK research also provides a fresh understanding of the 
role of sub-debts in the market discipline mechanism, advancing the current 
knowledge of sub-debts as an avenue for market discipline. 
Despite the facts that the spreads are proved to be an effective indicator of bank 
conditions containing timely and useful information on issuing financial institutions’ 
risk portfolios and that sub-debt issuance in the UK is more active and more liquid 
than in the European markets, there are obstacles in the UK for market discipline to 
work. Although empirical analysis shows an absence of significant TBTF effect,  
more than 72% of subordinated debts in our sample are issued by median- or 
large-sized financial institutions. The magnitude of coefficient on the total assets 
indicates the significant size effect and yield spreads reflect the market’s perception 
that all large banks in the UK will be bailed out when default occurs. 
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Table 1  
Rating Classes 
 
 
Rating Moody's  S&P Fitch MLTR 
1 Aaa AAA AAA Aaa 
2 Aa1,Aa2,Aa3 AA+,AA,AA- AA+,AA,AA- Aa1,Aa2,Aa3 
3 A1,A2,A3 A+,A,A- A+,A,A- A1,A2,A3 
4 Baa1,Baa2, Baa3 BBB+,BBB,BBB- BBB+,BBB,BBB- Baa1,Baa2,Baa3 
5 Lower ratings Lower ratings Lower ratings Lower ratings 
 
Table 1 reports the rating classification based on Moody’s, Standard & Poor (S&P), Fitch and 
Moody’s Long Term issuer ratings (MLTR). Ratings are sorted from 1 to 5 according to the rating 
scales where rating 1 represents the highest rating while rating 5 refers to the lower ratings and 
will be excluded in the model regression estimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table
Table 2  
Summary of Sample Descriptive Statistics by Rating Classes 
 
 
               Spreads (b.p)   Amount (USD mil) 
Rating 
Classes 
No. of 
issuance 
Mean Median Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
 Total Average 
  
Panel A. Standard & Poor’s issue ratings at launch 
1 19 50.50  35.00  0.00  325.00  73.59   5442.85  286.47  
2 111 74.14  48.00  0.00  290.00  69.58   55811.58  502.81  
3 279 112.37  94.00  0.00  659.00  103.34   156007.83  561.18  
4 98 158.28  162.50  0.00  565.00  104.77   18017.16  183.85  
5 124 181.27  99.00  0.00  933.00  212.43   22227.59  180.71  
Panel B. Moody’s issue ratings at launch 
1 15 50.73  29.00  0.00  325.00  83.30   5815.61  387.71  
2 212 99.07  72.50  0.00  659.00  92.31   131176.57  618.76  
3 182 106.51  85.00  0.00  633.00  100.56   80438.86  444.41  
4 96 145.30  141.50  0.00  565.00  110.08   18147.54  189.04  
5 126 185.94  117.50  0.00  933.00  209.37   21928.42  175.43  
Panel C. Fitch issue ratings at launch 
1 8 78.44  35.75  0.00  315.00  104.22   3563.76  445.47  
2 137 111.74  67.50  0.00  659.00  113.78   108220.84  789.93  
3 75 106.80  100.00  0.00  438.00  81.97   27796.63  370.62  
4 57 167.44  165.00  0.00  491.00  106.34   7566.64  132.75  
5 354 127.23  83.50  0.00  933.00  150.68   110359.13  313.52  
Panel D. Moody’s long term issuer rating  
1 34 72.29  55.00  0.00  236.00  71.54   14713.20  432.74  
2 288 110.46  75.00  0.00  659.00  111.14   154079.54  536.86  
3 177 114.85  95.00  0.00  633.00  106.69   68685.99  390.26  
4 30 201.17  175.00  0.00  933.00  199.77   5862.89  195.43  
5 98 175.14  120.00  0.00  896.00  193.66    13749.99  140.31  
 
Table 2 shows the sample descriptive statistics distributed by rating classes over the period 1997-
2009. Panels A, B, C and D indicate statistics summaries for Standard & Poor’s issue ratings at 
launch, Moody’s issue ratings at launch, Fitch issue ratings at launch and Moody’s long term 
issuer rating, respectively. 
 
Table 3  
Sample Descriptive Statistics Summary by Year and Currency 
 
    Average rating at launch               Spreads(bp)   Amount (USD mill) 
Panel A. Distribution by Year 
Year  No. S&P Moody Fitch MLTR   Mean St.dev Min Max   Total Average 
1997 24 3.71  3.42  5.00  3.04  
 
109.25  127.47  0.00  550.00  
 
3894.50  162.27  
1998 23 3.83  3.48  4.87  3.00  
 
202.30  249.01  0.00  933.00  
 
3363.95  146.26  
1999 42 3.38  3.31  4.79  3.17  
 
198.16  176.58  0.00  707.00  
 
13219.75  314.76  
2000 71 3.31  3.32  4.28  2.77  
 
127.63  108.41  0.00  445.00  
 
11282.15  158.90  
2001 106 2.96  3.23  4.01  2.96  
 
117.14  108.34  0.00  515.00  
 
25897.54  244.32  
2002 97 3.33  3.29  3.94  2.86  
 
110.23  122.62  0.00  896.00  
 
17451.70  179.91  
2003 46 3.13  2.59  3.83  2.65  
 
76.88  87.57  0.00  445.00  
 
25048.79  544.54  
2004 33 3.30  3.09  3.97  2.55  
 
94.00  122.76  0.00  594.00  
 
20849.39  672.56  
2005 44 3.64  3.32  2.93  2.67  
 
97.27  117.56  0.00  450.00  
 
24419.68  554.99  
2006 50 3.48  3.12  3.58  2.66  
 
94.43  85.50  0.00  315.00  
 
26008.99  520.18  
2007 57 3.39  3.00  3.33  2.68  
 
130.73  132.14  0.00  659.00  
 
44998.29  789.44  
2008 30 2.93  2.53  2.67  2.20  
 
184.47  131.87  0.00  450.00  
 
35121.39  1170.71  
2009 8 3.88  3.88  4.00  3.00  
 
266.75  265.05  0.00  633.00  
 
5950.89  743.86  
Panel B. Distribution by Currency 
Currency No. S&P Moody Fitch MLTR   Mean St.dev Min Max   Total Average 
STG 288 3.35 3.31 4.17 2.96 
 
147.16  121.56  0.00  638.00  
 
89008.13  309.06  
USD 152 3.36 3.05 3.73 2.68 
 
137.81  172.43  0.00  933.00  
 
85880.45  565.00  
EURO 156 3.31 3.19 3.86 2.65 
 
87.13  106.03  0.00  600.00  
 
77014.49  493.68  
Others  35 2.80  2.43 3.86 2.51   45.83  45.32  0.00  225.00    7605.35  217.30  
 
Panels A and B in Table 3 report the descriptive statistics of alternative measurements of the default risk: S&P, Moody’s, Fitch and MLTR distributions are sorted out 
by year and currency, respectively. STG is a dummy variable equals to one if the issue currency is Sterling; USD is a dummy variable equals to one if the issue 
currency is the U.S dollar while EURO is also a dummy variable equals to one if the euro is the issue currency. 
Table 4  
Sample Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  No. Mean Median Min Max St.dev 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Panel A. Sub-debt Characteristics           
MATU 631 14.65  10.15  0.16  42.68  10.80  6.09  20.30  1.10  3.01  
AMOUNT 631 5.17  5.52  -0.98  8.05  1.59  3.92  6.46  -0.74  2.98  
SPREAD 631 124.45  90.00  0.00  933.00  133.05  30.00  175.00  2.06  9.15  
Panel B. Accounting Variables           
LEV 523 22.44  20.86  0.20  404.42  26.79  13.79  26.99  11.16  158.85  
NLTA 507 0.55  0.58  0.00  8.43  0.78  0.31  0.65  8.28  84.27  
EITA 523 0.13  0.05  0.00  0.87  0.19  0.03  0.07  2.16  6.47  
LIQ 504 2.33  0.02  0.00  305.17  19.52  0.01  0.05  11.69  153.33  
LLRGL 401 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.01  2.08  11.95  
ROA 469 2.31  1.15  -88.53  31.57  7.66  0.83  3.02  -5.95  88.75  
SIZE 523 5.00  5.33  1.08  6.38  1.04  4.54  5.66  -1.46  4.68  
Panel C. Market Condition Variables            
FTSE 100 631 5447.86  5430.31  3436.05  6724.54  826.90  4908.40  6170.42  -0.41  2.12  
FTSEURO 584 3187.79  3217.27  1824.34  4150.76  543.18  2804.88  3617.96  -0.41  2.38  
NASDAQ 542 6081.13  5485.36  3290.41  14759.31  2302.33  4868.94  6332.03  1.89  6.30  
NIKKEI 631 13564.59  13175.49  7838.83  20833.21  3131.97  10882.18  16312.61  0.20  1.92  
LIBOR 631 5.04  4.98  0.66  7.81  1.10  4.13  5.86  -0.03  3.89  
EUROLIBOR 584 3.47  3.42  0.72  5.13  0.97  2.68  4.41  -0.06  2.07  
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of sub-debt characteristics, accounting variables and market 
conditions of the whole sample. Panel A refers to the variables of sub-debt characteristics. MATU is the 
time to maturity of issue; AMOUNT is the natural log value of the US dollar-equivalent amount of 
issue; SPREAD is the difference between the yields to maturity of sub-debt at launch of issuance and 
the yield to maturity of corresponding currency Treasury security with a similar maturity. Panel B 
shows the relevant accounting variables. LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of equity; 
NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets; EITA is the ratio of equity investments to total assets; LIQ 
is the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ deposits and short term funding; LLRGL is the ratio of loan 
loss reserves to total loans; ROA is the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and 
current year-end assets; SIZE is the natural log value of issuing bank’s total assets. FTSE100, 
FTSEURO, NASDAQ, NIKKEI, LIBOR and EUROLIBOR in Panel C are market condition variables 
to examine whether the booming of sub-debts is caused by the market discipline effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5  
Correlation Matrix 
Panel A. Correlations between sub-debt characteristics 
  SPREAD MATU AMOUNT         
SPREAD 1.0000  0.0485  -0.0933  
    
MATU 0.0485  1.0000  -0.2617  
    
AMOUNT -0.0933  -0.2617  1.0000  
    
Panel B. Correlations between rating variables 
  S&P Moody Finch MLTR       
S&P 1.0000  0.6781  0.3008  0.3020  
   Moody 0.6781  1.0000  0.3126  0.3862  
   Finch 0.3008  0.3126  1.0000  0.2934  
   
MLTR 0.3020  0.3862  0.2934  1.0000        
Panel C. Correlations between accounting variables 
  LEV NLTA EITA LIQ LLRGL SIZE ROA 
LEV 1.0000  0.1629  -0.0478  -0.1898  -0.2138  0.3882  -0.2523  
NLTA 0.1629  1.0000  0.5646  -0.0077  0.0135  -0.0102  -0.0127  
EITA -0.0478  0.5646  1.0000  0.0534  0.0964  -0.2193  0.1859  
LIQ -0.1898  -0.0077  0.0534  1.0000  0.2300  -0.2569  0.5357  
LLRGL -0.2138  0.0135  0.0964  0.2300  1.0000  -0.0194  -0.0213  
SIZE 0.3882  -0.0102  -0.2193  -0.2569  -0.0194  1.0000  -0.4862  
ROA -0.2523  -0.0127  0.1859  0.5357  -0.0213  -0.4862  1.0000  
Panel D. Correlations between market condition variables 
  FTSE100 FTSEURO NASDAQ NIKKEI  LIBOR EUROLIBOR   
FTSE100 1.0000  0.9485  0.6991  0.8860  0.8102  0.6896  
 
FTSEURO 0.9485  1.0000  0.7135  0.8429  0.7751  0.6954  
 
NASDAQ 0.6991  0.7135  1.0000  0.7245  0.6948  0.4986  
 
NIKKEI  0.8860  0.8429  0.7245  1.0000  0.7714  0.4664  
 
LIBOR 0.8102  0.7751  0.6948  0.7714  1.0000  0.7356  
 
EUROLIBOR 0.6896  0.6954  0.4986  0.4664  0.7356  1.0000    
 
Table 5 represents the correlation matrix for four groups of variables including sub-debt 
characteristics, rating variables, accounting variables and market condition variables. For sub-debt 
variables, SPREAD is the difference between the yields to maturity of sub-debt at launch of 
issuance and the yield to maturity of corresponding currency Treasury security with a similar 
maturity; MATU is the time to maturity of issue; AMOUNT is the natural log value of the US 
dollar-equivalent amount of issue. For rating variables, detail definition information could be 
found in Table 1. For accounting variables, LEV is the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of 
equity; NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets; EITA is the ratio of equity investments to total 
assets; LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ deposits and short term funding; LLRGL is 
the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans; ROA is the ratio of annual net income to the average 
of the preceding and current year-end assets. For market condition variables, main stock market 
indexes are adopted, such as FTSE100, FTSEURO, NASDAQ, NIKKEI, LIBOR and 
EUROLIBOR. 
Table 6 Regressions of Spreads on Rating Variables 
 
 
Variable 
S&P                        
(1) 
Moody's                   
(2) 
Fitch                                 
(3) 
MLTR                             
(4) 
R1 
-147.0927 -144.7407 -50.2418 -104.3877 
   [0.000]***     [0.000]*** [0.194]    [0.000]*** 
R2 
-105.6628 -93.1825 -13.7695 -61.4976 
   [0.000]***     [0.000]*** [0.257]    [0.003]*** 
R3 
-81.0896 -84.7025 -22.3855 -57.7842 
   [0.000]***     [0.000]***  [0.064]*    [0.007]*** 
R4 
-26.0822 -42.1069 46.6711 31.1169 
[0.213]  [0.052]*    [0.004]*** [0.467] 
AMOUNT 
0.0309 0.0304 0.0108 0.1918 
  [0.011]**   [0.019]** [0.450] [0.125] 
MATU 
0.3075 0.0374 -0.1274 0.2688 
[0.515] [0.939] [0.808] [0.601] 
STG 
75.1796 70.9184 96.1882 89.6388 
   [0.000]***     [0.000]***    [0.000]***    [0.000]*** 
USD 
62.5329 61.8449 88.3394 80.0893 
  [0.000]***    [0.000]***    [0.000]***    [0.000]*** 
EURO 
12.1011 7.9203 32.9412 32.9253 
[0.342] [0.503]   [0.016]**    [0.000]*** 
CONS 
117.765 127.7648 50.6385 93.0863 
   [0.000]***    [0.000]***    [0.000]***    [0.000]*** 
N  631 631 631 631 
R2 0.1379 0.1247 0.0713 0.1034 
Adj-R2 0.1254 0.1120  0.0578 0.0904 
F   17.84***    14.74***   13.87***    12.56*** 
Table 6 reports the results of standard OLS regression of spreads on rating variables over the 
sample period 1997-2009. SPREAD is the difference between the yields to maturity of sub-debts 
at launch of issuance and the yield to maturity of corresponding currency Treasury securities with 
a similar maturity; R1, R2, R3 and R4 are rating dummies which are defined as in Table 1. 
AMOUNT is the natural log value of the US dollar-equivalent amount of issue; MATU is the time 
to maturity of issue; STG is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue currency is sterling; USD 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue currency is the U.S dollar while EURO is also a 
dummy variable equal to one if the euro is the issue currency. All OLS regressions are robust with 
the White heteroskedasticity estimator of variance. P-values are shown in brackets while ***, **, 
* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7  
Fixed Effects and Random Effects Regressions of Spreads on Rating Variables 
 
 
  Fixed Effects (FE)   Random Effects (RE) 
Variables S&P (1) Moody's (2) Fitch (3) MLTR (4) 
 
S&P (1) Moody's (2) Fitch (3) MLTR (4) 
R1 
-159.8781 -145.8924 -32.3983 -50.0930  
 
-170.5750  -161.6458 -32.544 -120.0121 
   [0.000]***    [0.000]*** [0.393] [0.581] 
 
   [0.000]***    [0.000]*** [0.391]    [0.005]*** 
R2 
-94.9661 -48.7231 -8.5760  -10.7091 
 
-107.274 -68.3306 -7.9994 -86.3554 
   [0.000]***    [0.009]*** [0.538] [0.887] 
 
  [0.000]***    [0.000]*** [0.559]    [0.005]*** 
R3 
-54.986 -32.9696 -20.7129 23.1919 
 
-69.9684 -59.2051 -21.3647 -55.8423 
   [0.002]***  [0.085]* [0.205] [0.758]      [0.000]***    [0.000]*** [0.175]  [0.058]* 
R4 
11.3526 20.5477 62.4210  19.1048 
 
-7.0658  -5.9168 59.9672 5.8429 
[0.561] [0.310]    [0.001]*** [0.875] 
 
[0.689] [0.745]    [0.001]*** [0.902] 
AMOUNT 
0.1541 0.0103 0.0069 0.0004 
 
0.0182  0.0134 0.0059 0.0017 
[0.262] [0.464] [0.630] [0.979] 
 
[0.176] [0.332] [0.675] [0.903] 
MATU 
0.5539 0.7542 0.7915 1.0187 
 
0.3327  0.4549 0.5180  0.7489 
[0.257] [0.133] [0.122]   [0.049]** 
 
[0.481] [0.349] [0.295] [0.132] 
STG 
64.8475 69.9836 80.3129 83.9624 
 
71.1884  74.8416 88.6337 91.3662 
   [0.005]***    [0.003]***    [0.001]***    [0.001]*** 
 
   [0.001]***    [0.001]***    [0.000]***    [0.000]*** 
USD 
40.4879 48.8067 57.5431 60.0513 
 
50.9589  59.8079 71.6549 73.7213 
 [0.073]*   [0.036]**   [0.014]**   [0.012]** 
 
  [0.020]**    [0.008]***    [0.001]***    [0.000]*** 
EURO 
7.5718 14.2564 22.3220  27.6688 
 
12.5943  18.4684 30.7350  36.3174 
[0.742] [0.549] [0.354] [0.259] 
 
[0.572] [0.424] [0.187] [0.123] 
CONS 
147.2305 130.5502 99.6434 93.0796 
 
140.1743 140.6767 96.2107 139.9478 
   [0.000]***    [0.003]***   [0.013]** [0.243] 
 
   [0.000]***    [0.000]***    [0.007]***    [0.000]*** 
N 631 631 631 631   631 631 631 631 
Fixed Year YES YES YES YES 
 
YES YES YES YES 
R2-within 0.2593 0.2125 0.1869 0.1569 
 
0.2513 0.2014 0.1793 0.1468 
R2-between 0.0287 0.0186 0.0024 0.0064 
 
0.0965 0.1116 0.0442 0.1214 
R2-overall 0.1590  0.1317 0.1097 0.0986 
 
0.1866 0.1711 0.1349 0.1521 
F 7.92*** 6.10*** 5.20*** 4.21*** 
 
 -  -  -  -  
Wald-Chi  -  - 
 
 - 
 
173.90*** 136.35*** 110.55*** 101.30*** 
Hausman χ2 52.46*** 83.38*** 56.64*** 37.28**    -  -  -   - 
Table 7 shows estimates of regression of spreads on rating variables with both fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models. SPREAD is the difference between 
the yields to maturity of sub-debt at launch of issuance and the yield to maturity of corresponding currency Treasury security with a similar maturity; R1, R2, R3 and 
R4 are rating dummies which are defined as in Table 1. AMOUNT is the natural log value of the US dollar-equivalent amount of issue; MATU is the time to maturity 
of issue; STG is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue currency is sterling; USD is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue currency is the U.S dollar while 
EURO is also a dummy variable equal to one if the euro is the issue currency. Hausman χ
2
 is adopted to test the appropriateness of RE estimator with the null 
hypothesis that the RE estimator is consistent. Year dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets while ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Table 8  
Bivariate Linear Regressions on Accounting Measures and Market Condition 
Variables 
 
 
Variables 
Coef.                                                                                     
(p-value) 
Cons.Coef
(p-value) 
N 
F-statistics                               
(p-value) 
R2 Adj-R2 
Panel A. Accounting measures 
LEV 
-0.1123 129.6750  
523 
0.2500  
0.0014 0.0005 
[0.615]   [0.000]*** [0.615] 
NLTA 
-7.0650  129.1860  
507 
0.8300  
0.0016 0.0003 
[0.364]   [0.000]*** [0.364] 
EITA 
-20.8270  129.8350  
523 
0.4300  
0.0011 0.0008 
[0.514]   [0.000]*** [0.514] 
LIQ 
0.1189 125.5330  
504 
0.1500  
0.0017 0.0003 
[0.700]   [0.000]*** [0.699] 
LLRGL 
8.1520  110.8690  
401 
1.0500  
0..0026 0.0001 
[0.307]   [0.000]*** [0.307] 
ROA 
0.1710  128.1000  
469 
0.0400  
0.0021 0.0001 
[0.838]   [0.000]*** [0.838] 
SIZE 
-4.6100  150.2270  
523 
0.6500  
0.0012 0.0007 
[0.421]   [0.000]*** [0.421] 
Table 8 reports the bivariate linear regressions on accounting variables and market condition 
factors. Panel A is for accounting measures while Panel B is for market condition variables. The 
dependent variable is the spreads between yields (at issuance) on subordinated debt and a Treasury 
security of comparable maturity denominated in the same currency with similar maturity. LEV is 
the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of equity; NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets; 
EITA is the ratio of equity investments to total assets; LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ 
deposits and short term funding; LLRGL is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans; ROA is 
the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and current year-end assets; SIZE is 
the natural log value of issuing bank’s total assets. P-values are reported in brackets where ***, **, 
* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9 
Regression Results of Spreads on Bank Accounting Variables 
 
Variable OLS (1) Fixed Effects (2) Random Effects (3) 
LEV 
-0.4689  0.0606  -0.1643  
[0.515] [0.933] [0.804] 
NLTA 
5.5280  -5.8423  -2.2583  
[0.598] [0.479] [0.780] 
EITA 
-102.1987  -47.6484  -76.5229  
 [0.059]* [0.416] [0.172] 
LIQ 
-54.2489  -58.6312  -64.3873  
[0.625] [0.156] [0.107] 
LLRGL 
867.3590  933.9855  976.4465  
[0.480] [0.287] [0.251] 
ROA 
4.1193  2.8387  3.6602  
[0.131] [0.198]   [0.089]* 
SIZE 
4.8509  -8.5566  -2.6264  
[0.609] [0.414] [0.789] 
AMOUNT 
-0.0003  0.0117  0.0121  
[0.984] [0.526] [0.497] 
MATU 
0.7994  1.4639  1.3662  
[0.265]   [0.030]**   [0.033]** 
STG 
102.7231  87.8207  92.4284  
   [0.000]***    [0.005]***    [0.001]*** 
USD 
78.3938  55.4165  68.0243  
   [0.002]***  [0.061]*   [0.016]** 
Euro 
45.9345  26.3260  35.5147  
  [0.045]** [0.386] [0.219] 
CONS 
39.5636  139.3641  120.9813  
[0.508]  [0.051]*  [0.064]* 
N 351  351  351  
Fixed Year YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.1804   -  - 
Adj-R
2
 0.1200   -  - 
R2-within  - 0.2110  0.1970  
R2-between  - 0.0376  0.1440  
R2-overall  - 0.1115  0.1523  
F 4.16*** 2.72***  - 
Wald-Chi  -  -    71.51*** 
Hausman χ2  -  - 7.2400  
Table 9 shows the results of regression of spreads on bank accounting variables. The first column 
is for the traditional OLS regression which is robust with the White heteroskedasticity estimator of 
variance. The second column is for the fixed effects regressions while the third column is for the 
random effects regressions. The dependent variable is the spreads between yields (at issuance) on 
SND and a Treasury security of comparable maturity denominated in the same currency. LEV is 
the ratio of total liabilities to the book value of equity; NLTA is the ratio of net loans to total assets; 
EITA is the ratio of equity investments to total assets; LIQ is the ratio of liquid assets to customers’ 
deposits and short term funding; LLRGL is the ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans; ROA is 
the ratio of annual net income to the average of the preceding and current year-end assets; SIZE is 
the natural log value of issuing bank’s total assets. AMOUNT is the natural log value of the US 
dollar-equivalent amount of issue; MATU is the time to maturity of issue; STG is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the issue currency is sterling; USD is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
issue currency is the U.S dollar while EURO is also a dummy variable equal to one if the euro is 
the issue currency. Hausman χ
2
 is adopted to distinguish the appropriateness between the fixed and 
random effects estimator with the null hypothesis that the random effects estimator is more 
appropriate. Year dummies are also included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in 
brackets as ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 10 
Bivariate Linear Regressions on Accounting Measures and Market Condition 
Variables 
 
 
Variables 
Coef.                                                                                     
(p-value) 
Cons.Coef
(p-value) 
N 
F-statistics                               
(p-value) 
R2 Adj-R2 
FTSE 100 
0.0150  43.3800  
631 
5.4300  
0.0086 0.007 
 [0.020]** [0.218]    [0.020]** 
FTSEURO 
0.0260  40.7150  
584 
7.0400  
0.0119 0.0103 
  [0.008]*** [0.199]    [0.008]*** 
NASDAQ 
0.0020  109.9500  
542 
0.9100  
0.0017 0.0002 
[0.340]   [0.000]*** [0.340] 
NIKKEI 
0.0030  81.8110  
631 
3.4600  
0.0055 0.0039 
  [0.063]*   [0.001]***   [0.063]* 
LIBOR 
7.1740  88.2570  
631 
2.2100  
0.0035 0.0019 
[0.138]   [0.000]*** [0.138] 
EUROLIBOR 
14.2020  74.1200  
584 
6.7100  
0.0114 0.0097 
  [0.010]**  [0.000]***  [0.010]** 
 
This table reports outcome of the bivariate linear regressions on market condition factors. 
FTSE100, FTSEURO, NASDAQ, NIKKEI, LIBOR and EUROLIBOR are market condition 
variables that mainly represent worldwide stock market indexes. P-values are reported in brackets 
where ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11  
Regression Estimations of Spreads on Market Condition Variables 
Variable OLS (1) Fixed Effects (2) Random Effects (3) 
FTSE100 
-0.0023  -0.0208  -0.0187  
[0.919] [0.370] [0.408] 
FTSEURO 
0.0264  0.0541  0.0510  
[0.333]  [0.081]*  [0.087]* 
NASDAQ 
-0.0048  -0.0056  -0.0059  
[0.184] [0.113]   [0.082]* 
NIKKEI 
0.0041  0.0031  0.0038  
[0.412] [0.505] [0.398] 
LIBOR 
-14.6641  -11.1466  -13.4726  
[0.166] [0.325] [0.218] 
EUROLIBOR 
9.5690  5.7525  8.0186  
[0.358] [0.561] [0.401] 
AMOUNT 
-0.0121  0.0006  -0.0002  
[0.500] [0.973] [0.988] 
MATU 
0.0177  0.9201  0.5300  
[0.975] [0.117] [0.338] 
STG 
103.1557  80.1728  89.5948  
   [0.000]***    [0.003]***    [0.001]*** 
USD 
81.4469  53.7348  66.9569  
  [0.000]***   [0.039]**    [0.007]*** 
Euro 
45.4963  26.7020  34.2356  
 [0.017]** [0.320] [0.183] 
CONS 
-10.4301  60.1094  55.2934  
[0.844] [0.327] [0.328] 
N 542  542  542  
Fixed Year YES YES YES 
R
2
 0.1607   -  - 
Adj-R
2
 0.1234   -  - 
R2-within  - 0.1770  0.1707  
R2-between  - 0.0141  0.0589  
R2-overall  - 0.1248  0.1456  
F 4.92*** 3.7500   - 
Wald-Chi  -  -    91.31*** 
Hausman χ2  - 29.09**   
 
Table 11 reports the linear regressions of spreads on market condition measurements. The first 
column lists the traditional OLS regression results which are robust with the White 
heteroskedasticity estimator of variance. The second column lists the fixed effects regression 
outcome while the third column shows the results of random effects regressions. The dependent 
variable is the spreads between yields (at issuance) on sub-debt and a Treasury security of 
comparable maturity denominated in the same currency. FTSE100, FTSEURO, NASDAQ, 
NIKKEI are market condition variables that represent worldwide stock market indexes. LIBOR 
and EUROLIBOR are the London inter-bank lending rate and the Eurocurrency market rate, 
respectively, capturing the conditions of credit markets. AMOUNT is the natural log value of the 
US dollar-equivalent amount of issue; MATU is the time to maturity of issue; STG is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the issue currency is Sterling; USD is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
issue currency is the U.S dollar while EURO is also a dummy variable equal to one if the euro is 
the issue currency. Hausman χ
2
 is adopted to distinguish the appropriateness between FE and RE 
estimator with the null hypothesis that the RE estimator is appropriate. Year dummies are also 
included to control the year effect. P-values are shown in brackets as ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 Highlights 
 
 UK bank’s sub-debt spreads are sensitive to bank’s risk-taking 
 Credit ratings and market condition indexes co-vary with UK bank’s sub-debt spreads 
 Sub-debt investors have incentives to differentiate UK banks 
 UK sub-debts satisfy a precondition for market discipline in banking 
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